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Representative/Senator Trump? 
Gary Lawson* 
The 2016 presidential election sent many people, including 
many otherwise seemingly sensible people, completely over the 
edge. College and university campuses en masse set up 
counseling services for disappointed students, and I suspect that 
many faculty and administrators probably “used” those services 
at least vicariously. Former friends were ostracized—or, even 
worse, “unfriended” on Facebook—for the heinous sin of voting 
for Donald Trump. Ordinarily sober scholars describe President 
Trump’s election as a symptom of “constitutional rot.”1 At my 
own institution, at a post-election panel on which I participated 
as the faculty’s token knuckle-dragger, student questions 
focused largely on how President Trump could be removed from 
office—several months before he actually assumed that office. A 
list of anecdotes of this kind could go on for quite a while. 
In all fairness to my grieving colleagues and students, I feel 
their pain. A lot of us sucked it up, without any school-provided 
puppies, for the eight years of the Obama Administration, but it 
was a thoroughly miserable time for anyone concerned about 
individual freedom. And although I did not vote for George W. 
Bush in 2000—I voted for Libertarian Harry Browne—I vividly 
remember that, at one brief moment during election night, I 
actually felt physically ill when it looked like the execrable Al 
Gore might ride his fevered fantasies about feverish planets into 
the White House. Presidential elections seem to matter a great 
deal to a lot of people. 
From a constitutionalist standpoint,2 this is something of a 
puzzle. The United States Constitution simply does not appear to 
 
 * Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law. This article was 
prepared for a symposium sponsored by the Chapman Law Review on “Constraining the 
Executive,” and I thank the editors for inviting me to participate. I am grateful to R.J. 
Pestritto and Joe Postell for helpful suggestions, though they bear no responsibility for 
anything that I say here. 
 1 Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot and Constitutional Crisis, 77 MARYLAND L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
 2 By “constitutionalist” I mean nothing more linguistically complex than “by 
reference to and in accordance with the meaning of the United States Constitution.” That 
meaning was fixed—at least for the original Constitution and quite possibly for 
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make the president all that important of a figure. To be sure, in 
times of war, the president is commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces,3 but the Constitution gives Congress the powers to 
“declare War,” to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” to 
“make Rules regarding Captures,” to “raise and support Armies,” 
to “provide and maintain a Navy,” to “make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces,” and 
to provide for “calling forth” and “organizing, arming, and 
disciplining, the Militia.”4 Congress actually has most of the 
constitutional war powers–so much so that the Commander-in-
Chief Clause was necessary to foreclose an inference that 
Congress also has the un-enumerated, but implied, power to 
control troop movements.5 Furthermore, while the president’s 
“executive Power”6 gives him7 control over the law enforcement 
machinery, that power is subject to duties to “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed”8 and to carry out executive 
responsibilities in accordance with fiduciary principles.9 More 
fundamentally, executive power is, in all but a very small set of 
contexts, a purely implementational power that comes into play 
only to execute law that is provided from sources external to the 
executive.10 The president can also grant pardons,11 convene and 
adjourn Congress,12 and, with the advice and consent of the 
 
amendments as well—in 1788, in the sense that the criteria for determining the referents 
of the concepts in the Constitution are determined by the cognitive framework of a 
reasonable reader in 1788. See Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (or: 
Could Fleming Be Right This Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457, 1460–67 (2016); Gary Lawson 
& Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006). 
 3 I believe that this authority comes from the Vesting Clause of Article I rather than 
from the more specific Commander-in-Chief Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, which 
states that “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States.” This simply confirms the president’s “executive Power” to command the 
military, but that point is incidental to the present argument. 
 4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–16. 
 5 Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1, 29–30 (2006). 
 6 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 7 The Constitution consistently refers to the president by a generic male pronoun. I 
therefore follow that practice, without endorsing it. 
 8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 9 For a book-length defense of the proposition that all constitutional powers, 
including the executive power, are fiduciary powers, see GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, 
“A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017). 
For an article-length defense of a duty of care on the part of federal officials, and therefore 
of a presidential duty of care in the execution of the laws, see Gary Lawson & Guy 
Seidman, By Any Other Name: Rational Basis Inquiry and the Federal Government’s 
Fiduciary Duty of Care, 69 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
 10 See Gary Lawson, Take the Fifth . . . Please! The Original Insignificance of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, 2017 BYU L. REV. 611, 631 (2018). 
 11 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 12 Id. § 3. 
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Senate, make appointments and treaties,13 but it is hard to see 
how powers of this kind could generate Caesarian nightmares. 
The sum total of constitutional presidential powers is far 
from trivial; the American president is—and always was—a 
formidable constitutional figure.14 But it is not necessarily a life-
altering huge sum either. Even if one believes, as I emphatically 
do, that the Article II Vesting Clause grants the president all 
power that falls within the conceptual category of “executive 
Power,”15 the conceptual lines of the power limit its scope. 
Possessing the “executive Power” does not allow the president to 
take over steel mills unilaterally in order to help a war effort,16 
and it does not allow the president to order federal courts to 
dismiss pending cases in order to promote foreign policy goals.17 
If one looks at the presidency through a constitutional lens, it is 
hard to see why people would get as emotionally charged as they 
do about who occupies that office. As a matter of original 
meaning, it just would not make that much of a difference in 
most people’s lives. It probably matters more who is mayor of 
one’s city—and perhaps even who is on the local zoning board. 
As a matter of political and social reality rather than original 
meaning, of course, strong reactions to presidential elections are 
more understandable. The modern presidency bears little 
relationship to the office created by the Constitution of 1788.18 
Presidents today matter far more than they should if one’s 
touchstone is the Constitution. For one thing, presidents have, 
with the blessing of Congress, assumed powers of at best dubious 
constitutional lineage on everything from uses of military force19 
 
 13 Id. § 2, cl. 2. 
 14 See generally SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE (2015). 
 15 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 5, at 22–43. For the most powerful rebuttal to 
that position, see Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Constitution’s 
“Executive Vesting Clause”—Evidence from Eighteenth-Century Drafting Practice, 31 
WHITTIER L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 16 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (correctly 
so holding). 
 17 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675–76 (1981) (not doing quite as well 
as Youngstown, and indeed pretty much making a botch of everything). 
 18 It is conventional to use 1789 as the starting date for the United States 
Constitution. That is the correct date for when a fully functioning government under the 
Constitution, including a sworn-in Congress and president, first appeared. The 
Constitution, however, became law for the ratifying states on June 21, 1788 (or at most 
shortly thereafter), and at least some important portions of the Constitution were 
effective as of the summer of 1788. See generally Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did 
the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2001). 
 19 See Gary Lawson, Inigo Montoya Goes to War, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1355, 1364–67 
(2015) (describing constitutional controversies over the scope of presidential power to 
initiate hostilities). 
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to the unilateral establishment of military governments in 
peacetime within the United States.20 For another thing, federal 
courts have routinely assumed powers far beyond those 
plausibly attributable to the “judicial Power”21 conferred by the 
Constitution. Consequently, the power to appoint federal judges 
has acquired significance beyond anything contemplated in the 
eighteenth century. But most importantly, in modern times, the 
election of the American president effectively elects the federal 
legislature as well. That is because the executive has become, for 
all practical purposes, the legislative department (at least when 
the judicial department chooses not to assume that authority). 
Modern executive action, through regulations, adjudications, and 
enforcement decisions, creates law that often has far more effect 
on people’s lives than the entire mass of congressional legislation 
does. Congress has fostered that development by delegating—or, 
more precisely, subdelegating22—much of its legislative authority 
to the executive department via open-ended statutes that 
essentially instruct executive actors to go forth and do good. A 
great many federal statutes make lawmakers, not laws. As a 
consequence, presidential elections determine far more than the 
Constitution of 1788 ever had in mind. It is no wonder that 
people get so invested in them. 
That level of investment is potentially a bad thing in several 
respects. It is constitutionally bad because it reflects a perversion 
of the constitutional design. It is socially bad if one believes that 
politics should not matter so much that people turn on each other 
for supporting different candidates and policies. And it might be 
intellectually bad because people who care too much about 
something do not always think clearly and logically about it. 
Part One of this essay very briefly catalogues the extent to 
which the American presidency has effectively become the 
American Congress through subdelegation of legislative 
authority. Part Two just as briefly explains why that is a 
constitutional perversion. Part Three suggests, contrary to the 
fears of many who are in the throes of Trump Derangement 
Syndrome, how the Trump presidency may present the best 
opportunity in generations to reverse the trend of subdelegation 
and begin the long process of reining in executive power. 
 
 20 That happened? Yep, that happened. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The 
Hobbesian Constitution: Governing without Authority, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 581, 617–24 (2001). 
 21 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 22 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 377 (2014) 
(explaining that the constitutional “delegation” problem is really a subdelegation problem 
because Congress was delegated the legislative power in the first instance). 
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Ironically, the change agent, if any change actually happens, is 
likely to be President Trump. 
In no event do I expect the presidency of 2020 to look 
anything like the presidency of 1788. But for the first time 
in a long time, there is a chance that one might see some 
movement on that front toward, rather than away from, the 
United States Constitution. 
I. “MEET THE NEW BOSS” 
The American presidency has grown in power since 1788 for 
many reasons, and it would require someone better versed than I 
in both history and political science to describe and analyze them 
all.23 But one of those reasons obviously dwarfs in magnitude all 
of the others: Congress has essentially designated the president 
as its substitute legislature. The expansion of presidential power 
through subdelegation of legislative authority is so enormous 
that any attempt to restrain executive power that does not 
address the subdelegation problem head-on is like putting band-
aids on Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid after their final 
encounter with the Bolivian police. The federal executive now 
functions as the federal legislature for many, and perhaps even 
most, practical purposes. Federal law, in the modern world, is 
largely an executive construct. The observation is common 
enough to be almost mundane. As Professor Mila Sohoni aptly 
summarized the conventional wisdom: 
Due to gridlock and partisanship, Congress is less able to act as an 
effective lawmaker and hence as an institution that actually authorizes 
and controls agency action. With respect to some statutes . . . , 
Congress has conferred primary custodianship over the shape and 
structure of regulatory schemes on agencies by giving agencies the 
power to waive and alter key statutory requirements. In other 
areas . . . , the accretion of complex statutory schemes and the opacity 
of legislative intent have together produced a system of “de 
facto delegation” that effectively transfers lawmaking power to the 
executive branch.24 
 
 23 For an outstanding effort at such an account by someone better versed than I in 
both history and political science, see generally JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN 
AMERICA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 
(2017). Professor Postell’s book is an indispensable supplement and, in some cases, 
antidote to Professor Jerry Mashaw’s seminal book on early administrative law. See 
generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012). 
 24 Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: Agencies, Spending, and Economic Rights, 
66 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1701 (2017) (footnotes omitted). 
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Professor Adrian Vermeule put it even more succinctly: “[T]he 
executive and administrative sector of the state . . . often 
overshadows the classical institutions of the Constitution of 
1789 altogether.”25 
There is no uniquely correct way to measure the relative 
influence of legislative and executive—and, for that matter, 
judicial—action in the creation of federal law. But even crude 
metrics tell an important story. At the end of 2012, the number of 
pages in the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) exceeded the 
number of pages in the United States Code by a factor of nearly 
four.26 Notwithstanding the numerous problems, vectoring in 
somewhat different directions, with this comparison—the 
Statutes at Large rather than the United States Code is the 
better measure of congressional lawmaking; many regulations 
simply parrot statutory language and thus add nothing to the 
legal baseline;27 gross volume numbers do not convey information 
about relative importance; and an enormous amount of federal 
law is made through executive adjudication rather than 
executive rulemaking, and thus does not show up in measures of 
the CFR—there is something striking about the raw figures 
comparing statutes and regulations. At the very least, it 
constitutes a piece of concrete evidence, if any is actually needed, 
that executive lawmaking is central to modern governance. 
Casual anecdotalism28 sheds further light on the relative 
importance of executive and legislative action in the creation of 
federal law. Two of the most important statutes enacted during 
the Obama Administration—The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act29 and the Dodd-Frank Act30—consume 
thousands of pages of text between them, but they are both 
toothless in important respects until implemented through 
significant regulatory action. As with most modern regulatory 
 
 25 ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 3 (2016). 
 26 See Tom Cummins, Code Words, 5 J. LEGAL METRICS 89, 98 (2015). 
 27 Such “parroting” regulations could add to the legal baseline if they were given 
deference by courts. But regulations that simply repeat what is said in statutes do not 
receive deference. See Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257–58 (2006). To be sure, 
regulations do not seem to need to differ much from statutory language in order to avoid 
the “anti-parroting” rule of Gonzalez. See Plateau Mining Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety & 
Health Review Comm’n, 519 F.3d 1176, 1192–93 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 28 Yes, it is a word. I looked it up. 
 29 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 30 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
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statutes, they frequently authorize executive agencies to make 
law rather than prescribe rules of conduct for executive agencies 
to implement. 
Consider, as just one example, some interlocking provisions 
from the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).31 One of the central 
concepts underlying the ACA is the “qualified health plan,” which 
is the only kind of plan that can be sold on the ACA exchanges. It 
is therefore vital under the statute to know what makes a health 
care plan “qualified.” The basic statutory definition of a “qualified 
health plan” is one that “has in effect a certification . . . that such 
plan meets the criteria for certification described in section 
18031(c) of this title.”32 The criteria for certification prescribed 
by section 18031(c) are: “The Secretary [of Health and Human 
Services] shall, by regulation, establish criteria for the 
certification of health plans as qualified health plans.”33 In other 
words, the statute does not establish the criteria but instructs an 
executive official to provide them. To be sure, the statute then 
sets out nine considerations that must be part of that executive 
prescription, but those considerations are basically drivel,34 much 
as were the statutory “constraints” in the National Industrial 
Recovery Act35 or the directions to the United States Sentencing 
Commission in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.36 The ACA 
also makes clear that a qualified health plan must “provide[] the 
essential health benefits package described in section 18022(a).”37 
It is anticlimactic to point out that section 18022(a) reads in 
relevant part: “[T]he term ‘essential health benefits package’ 
means, with respect to any health plan, coverage that . . . provides 
for the essential health benefits defined by the Secretary [of 
Health and Human Services] under subsection (b).”38 
These provisions are noteworthy in modern times for being 
more specific than one has come to expect from major 
 
 31 For an interesting discussion of subdelegation of legislative authority under the 
Dodd-Frank Act and other securities laws, see Usha R. Rodrigues, Dictation and 
Delegation in Securities Regulation, 92 IND. L. J. 435, 437 (2017). See also Tom Campbell, 
Executive Action and Nonaction, 95 N.C. L. REV. 553, 566 (2017) (noting that the Dodd-
Frank Act contains “398 specific calls in the statute for regulatory agencies, including the 
newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, to issue rules, interpreting 
vague concepts such as ‘unfairness’ by financial institutions, and ‘systemic risk’”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 32 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 33 Id. § 18031(c)(1). 
 34 See id. § 18031(c)(1)(A)–(I). 
 35 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 534–35 (1935). 
 36 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374–77 (1989). 
 37 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(B). The plan must also be provided by a properly licensed 
insurer. See id. § 18021(a)(1)(C). 
 38 Id. § 18022(a)(1). 
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congressional legislation. The Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008,39 one of the most famous (or infamous) legislative 
legacies to emerge from the second Bush Administration, handed 
the Secretary of the Treasury three quarters of a trillion dollars 
with which to “purchase . . . troubled assets from any financial 
institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by 
the Secretary.”40 “Troubled assets,” in case anyone wonders, are 
mortgages and “any other financial instrument that the 
Secretary . . . determines the purchase of which is necessary to 
promote financial market stability . . . .”41 Throw on such old 
standards that populate the United States Code as the 
Communications Act of 193442 and the Clean Air Act,43 and one 
can see that much modern legislation does not make law, but 
instead merely designates executive agents as lawmakers.44 The 
president, as the ultimate repository of all executive power, 
thereby becomes the de facto Congress. The president and other 
executive agents make the law. President Trump is thus also, 
over a staggeringly large range of cases, Representative Trump 
and Senator Trump to boot—with no requirements of quorums, 
cloture, or majority votes to stand in the way of his lawmaking. 
To be sure, in the real world it is “other executive agents” far 
more than it is the president who makes the law. The federal 
executive apparatus is so enormous that even the most 
 
 39 Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 
26 U.S.C.). 
 40 12 U.S.C. § 5211 (2012). 
 41 Id. § 5202 (2012). The subdelegation problem was just one of many constitutional 
infirmities with the Troubled Assets Relief Program (“TARP”). See Gary Lawson, Burying 
the Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 57–58 (2010). 
 42 47 U.S.C. § 307 (2012) (providing that the Federal Communications Commission 
shall grant broadcast licenses to applicants “if public convenience, interest, or necessity 
will be served thereby”).  
 43 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012) (providing that the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency shall set primary air quality standards, “the attainment and 
maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria and 
allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health”). 
 44 For a less consequential, but no less legally significant, example, consider the law 
underlying the events in Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). Captain Yates 
threw overboard some undersized grouper that he had caught in the Gulf of Mexico, and 
he was prosecuted for concealing a “tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or 
influence” a federal investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012). The Yates Supreme Court 
decision focused on whether fish were “tangible object[s]” within the meaning of this 
statute, Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1077, but consider for a moment why Captain Yates felt the 
need to throw his fish overboard. What federal statute prescribed the maximum length of 
red grouper for American fishing vessels? There was no such statute; the only relevant 
statute made it illegal “to violate . . . any regulation or permit” issued by the National 
Marine Fisheries Services. 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(A) (2012). For a more detailed account of 
the federal “law”—all stemming from executive regulations—regarding the permissible 
size of Gulf of Mexico red grouper, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 108–09. 
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committed president can control only a tiny fraction of what 
actually goes on within it. Congressional subdelegation thus 
creates an alternative multi-member Congress within the 
executive whose institutional functioning is too complex to be 
captured by any simple analogy. Nonetheless, as a formal matter, 
all executive power is lodged in the president, even if he cannot 
always effectively exercise it in the face of a “deep state” that has 
its own agenda(s). 
Of course, there are serious limits even to this expanded 
executive power, as recent (as of July 2017) events concerning 
efforts to repeal or amend the ACA demonstrate. The president 
cannot simply wave a law into or out of existence. The legislature 
is not irrelevant. But the constitutional role of the legislature is 
not to be “not irrelevant.” It is to make the law, which is then 
executed by the president and other executive agents. Much of 
the time, that is simply not how it works. 
II. “WHY SHOULD I CARE, WHY SHOULD I CARE?” 
Is it really a constitutional problem if the president makes 
the law? To ask the question is to answer it, at least as a matter 
of original meaning. Indeed, there are few propositions of 
constitutional meaning as thoroughly overdetermined as the 
unconstitutionality of subdelegations of legislative authority. I 
have spent much of the past quarter century defending that 
claim, and I will not repeat those extensive arguments here 
beyond the brief references in this section. 
One can discern a constitutional principle against 
subdelegation of legislative authority through any number of 
convergent lines of reasoning. The basic principle of enumerated 
powers reserves all “legislative powers herein granted” to 
Congress and thus denies them to executive (or judicial) agents,45 
whose enumerated powers do not include the power to legislate. 
A law subdelegating legislative power to the president or an 
executive official would not be “necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution” federal powers.46 To let the president make, 
rather than execute, law would violate the principle of legality 
that has been part of the Anglo-American legal tradition since 
the Magna Carta and that underlies the constitutional idea of 
due process of law.47 And, most powerfully and fundamentally, 
 
 45 See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 180–81 (7th ed. 2016). 
 46 See Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 242–67 (2005); Gary Lawson, 
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 345–52 (2002). 
 47 See Lawson, supra note 10, at 618–26.  
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subdelegation violates the fiduciary principles that underlie the 
Constitution. The United States Constitution is most aptly 
characterized as a kind of fiduciary instrument,48 and the 
background principles of interpretation for the document are 
therefore at least partially defined by the background rules for 
interpretation of eighteenth-century fiduciary instruments.49 One 
of the best-established eighteenth-century fiduciary duties is the 
requirement that agents exercising delegated discretionary 
authority personally exercise rather than subdelegate that 
authority.50 Accordingly, if a fiduciary instrument is to allow the 
agent to subdelegate discretionary authority,51 the instrument 
needs specifically to provide for such authority, at least where 
authority to subdelegate is not incidental to the granted power. 
The United States Constitution contains no specific authorization 
for the subdelegation of legislative—or, for that matter, of 
executive or judicial—power. As Guy Seidman and I have said: 
There is no affirmative grant of power in the Constitution to 
subdelegate legislative authority. The necessary and proper clause, 
the only plausible source of such authority, only authorizes incidental 
powers, and the power to sub-delegate can be incidental only with 
respect to ministerial tasks, or where delegation is necessary in a 
strict sense, or where there was in the eighteenth century an 
established custom or usage of subdelegation. In other words, 
understanding the agency-law foundations of the Constitution 
confirms what textual, intratextual, and structural analysis all reveal: 
Congress may not delegate its legislative power to other actors, be 
they executive agents, judicial agents, state governments, foreign 
sovereigns, or private parties. The rule against subdelegation of 
legislative authority is among the clearest constitutional rules one 
can imagine.52 
Outside of governance of occupied territory during wartime53 and 
the constitutionally specified power to make treaties,54 the 
president is not supposed to make laws. That is the job of the 
constitutionally vested legislative authority. The president is 
supposed to execute (and faithfully execute) the laws provided 
by others. 
 
 48 See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 49–75. 
 49 See id. at 8–11, 76–78. 
 50 See id. at 113–17. 
 51 Agents are generally free, absent specification in the governing instrument, to 
subdelegate the performance of ministerial tasks.  
 52 LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 117. 
 53 See GARY LAWSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL 
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 47–51 (2004). 
 54 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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The real question is not whether Congress can subdelegate 
discretionary authority—the short answer is “no.” The real 
question is what constitutes an act of subdelegation. Surely 
Congress cannot subdelegate its formal Article I, Section 7 power 
to vote on bills, but suppose Congress exercises that formal 
power by enacting Article I, Section 7 laws that tell executive 
agents to go find problems and then fix them. Does the 
constitutional anti-subdelegation principle control the content of 
the laws that Congress can enact? Does it forbid granting 
executive (and judicial) agents a certain kind, quantity, and 
quality of discretion, even if those grants fulfill the formal 
procedural requirements for constitutional lawmaking? 
Some say no. For example, in the early 2000s, Eric Posner 
and Adrian Vermeuele argued that Congress can only be said to 
subdelegate its power when it transfers its formal authority 
under Article I, Section 7; it can never be said to subdelegate 
when it vests substantive authority in executive agents, no 
matter how open-ended the grant of authority may be.55 I have 
an article-length response to that argument elsewhere,56 and that 
response is both supported and supplanted by subsequent work 
on the fiduciary underpinnings of the Constitution.57 Congress is 
not granted a general legislative power. It is charged with 
specific tasks and given tools with which to perform those tasks. 
Those charges call for the exercise of discretionary authority, and 
in the absence of specific authorization to subdelegate those 
authorities, Congress must exercise those powers itself. Under 
basic fiduciary principles, Congress cannot pass off the exercise 
of those discretionary acts to others, even by enactments that 
follow the form of Article I, Section 7: 
Consider just the structure of Article I, Section 8. Its first seventeen 
clauses contain provisions that give Congress power to perform such 
actions as to “lay and collect,” “borrow,” “regulate,” “establish,” 
“coin . . . , regulate . . . , and fix,” “provide,” “establish,” “promote . . . by 
securing,” “constitute,” “define and punish,” “declare . . . , grant . . . , 
and make Rules concerning,” “raise and support,” “provide and 
maintain,” “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of,” 
 
 55 See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, 
Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331 (2003). 
 56 See Lawson, Discretion as Delegation, supra note 46. 
 57 See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 107–26. I would be remiss if I did not 
thank Robert Natelson for making me aware of the importance of understanding the 
fiduciary character of the Constitution. My long-time collaborator Guy Seidman saw that 
point before I did, and he pushed me a bit in that direction, but Mr. Natelson’s work is 
what really brought home to both me and Professor Seidman the need to bring fiduciary 
concepts to bear on constitutional interpretation across the board. 
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“provide for calling forth,” “provide for organizing, arming, and 
disciplining,” and “exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases 
whatsoever, over” . . . . Exactly who, in this governmental scheme, is 
supposed to be doing the lion’s share of the laying and collecting, 
borrowing, regulating, establishing, coining, regulating, fixing, 
providing, establishing, promoting by securing, constituting, defining 
and punishing, declaring, granting, making Rules concerning, raising 
and supporting, providing and maintaining, making Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of, providing for calling forth, providing 
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, and exercising exclusive 
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over?58 
Just as not everything done by presidents through procedurally 
proper means is necessarily a constitutionally valid exercise of 
“executive Power,” and not everything done by courts through 
procedurally proper means is necessarily a constitutionally valid 
exercise of “judicial Power,” not everything done by Congress 
through procedurally proper means is necessarily a 
constitutionally valid exercise of the various “legislative Powers 
herein granted” with which Congress is vested. The principle 
against subdelegation is substantive, not formal. 
To be sure, the conceptual lines between the constitutionally 
vested legislative and executive powers are not always crisp. It 
does not necessarily violate the Constitution for Congress to pass 
a law that requires some measure of interpretation. Figuring out 
where the executive power ends and the legislative power begins 
“is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry,”59 and James Madison 
drily observed that “[q]uestions daily occur in the course of 
practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, 
and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.”60 
That adept-puzzling obscurity, however, did not stop Madison from 
categorically declaring that various powers of government are “in 
their nature . . . legislative, executive, or judiciary.” Nor did it stop 
John Adams from stating that the “three branches of power have an 
unalterable foundation in nature; that they exist in every 
society natural and artificial . . . ; that the legislative and executive 
authorities are naturally distinct; and that liberty and the laws 
depend entirely on a separation of them in the frame of 
government . . . .” Nor did it prevent many state constitutions of the 
founding era from including separation-of-powers clauses that 
expressly distinguished, again without express definitions, the 
legislative from the executive from the judicial powers. Nor did it 
prevent the United States Constitution from basing its entire scheme 
 
 58 Lawson, Discretion as Delegation, supra note 46, at 263. 
 59 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825). 
 60 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison). 
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of governance on the distinctions among those powers. However 
difficult it may be at the margins to distinguish those categories of 
power from each other, the founding generation assumed that there 
was a fact of the matter about those distinctions and that one could 
discern that fact in at least a large range of cases. The communicative 
meaning of the Constitution of 1788 cannot be ascertained without 
reference to some such distinction, even if legal scholars or political 
scientists (adept or otherwise) find the distinction unhelpful 
or confusing.61 
As Chief Justice John Marshall memorably put it:  
The line has not been exactly drawn which separate those important 
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, 
from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, 
and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions 
to fill up the details.62  
But wherever and however that line is properly drawn, huge 
swaths of modern law go beyond any plausible boundaries. Going 
forth and doing good pursuant to a statute that instructs the 
executive to go forth and do good is not an exercise of “executive 
Power” under any sensible eighteenth-century understanding of 
that concept, and that simple observation is enough to sweep in 
many of the statutes at the core of modern law. Nor is enactment 
of such a law a valid exercise of legislative power. Congress, 
under the Constitution, must enact laws, not empty collections 
of words. 
This is as good a place as any to respond to a recent critique 
of this argument from Adrian Vermeule. Professor Vermeule 
maintains that “the institutional innovations that appall Lawson 
[such as subdelegation of legislative authority] were themselves 
generated by the very system of lawmaking-by-separation-of-powers 
that he wants to defend. Lawson never comes to grip with the 
problem of abnegation, the brute fact that everything Lawson 
deems inconsistent with the Constitution of 1789 emerged 
through and by means of the operation of that very Constitution, 
not despite it.”63 More broadly: 
We have an administrative state that has been created and limited by 
the sustained and bipartisan action of Congress and the President 
over time; that is supervised and checked by the President as it 
operates; and that has been blessed by an enduring bipartisan 
consensus on the Supreme Court. The classical Constitution of 
separated powers, cooperating in joint lawmaking across all three 
 
 61 Lawson, supra note 10, at 623–34(footnotes omitted). 
 62 Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43. 
 63 VERMEULE, supra note 25, at 42.  
Do Not Delete 3/11/18 3:56 PM 
124 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:1 
branches, itself gave rise to the administrative state. When critics of 
the administrative state call for a return to the classical Constitution, 
they do not seem to realize they are asking for the butterfly to return 
to its own chrysalis. If political legitimacy is not to be found in this 
long-sustained and judicially-approved joint action of Congress and 
the President, the premier democratically elected and democratically 
legitimate bodies in our constitutional system . . . and the real complaint 
of the critics is not that the administrative state is illegitimate, but that 
our whole constitutional order is intrinsically misguided.64 
This argument rests on a distressingly common error: it conflates 
arguments about textual meaning with arguments about political 
and moral legitimacy. I have in the past made, and am here 
making, no claims whatsoever about the political legitimacy vel 
non of the administrative state, the Constitution in general, or 
any form of governmental organization. As I have said elsewhere: 
I have nothing interesting to say about such matters, and so I choose 
to say nothing about them. Legitimacy is a political and moral 
concept, and I am not a political or moral theorist . . . . To be sure, 
political legitimacy is an important thing about which to think. It just 
is not the province of legal theory, and I would prefer not to venture 
outside that relatively narrow zone of comfort in professional 
academic work.65  
My only claim, here and elsewhere, is that subdelegation of 
legislative authority is contrary to the meaning of the 
Constitution. I declare nothing about what any real-world person 
ought to do with that information or how any past, present, or 
future political actors should respond to it.66 And I emphatically 
make no claim that constitutional infidelity is a distinctively 
modern phenomenon. The very first statute enacted by the 
very first Congress was wildly, flagrantly, and knowingly 
unconstitutional.67 So are a great many statutes that have been 
enacted by past and present congresses, signed and enforced by 
past and present presidents, and upheld and applied by past and 
present judges. That is not “hubris.”68 That is empirical fact, as 
all claims of constitutional meaning are claims of empirical fact. 
It may or may not be an intellectually interesting empirical fact, 
depending upon one’s intellectual interests, but it is an empirical 
fact. In other words, in my professional guise, I do not see myself 
 
 64 Id. at 46 (citation omitted). 
 65 Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism 
and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1567 (2012) (footnotes omitted). 
 66 For more on the oft-elided distinction between claims of constitutional meaning 
and claims of political obligation, see Gary Lawson, Originalism without Obligation, 93 
B.U. L. REV. 1309 (2013). 
 67 See Gary Lawson, The Constitution’s Congress, 89 B.U. L. REV. 399, 403–06 (2009). 
 68 VERMEULE, supra note 25, at 45. 
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as a “critic[] of the administrative state.”69 I see myself as a 
disinterested expositor of the Constitution.70 As a straightforward 
interpretative matter, the Constitution forbids the subdelegation 
of legislative authority, no matter how socially inevitable, 
normatively desirable, or politically legitimate it may be. One can 
certainly elect to choose social inevitability, normative desirability, 
or political legitimacy over the Constitution, but that has no 
bearing on what the Constitution actually says. 
III. “YOU NEED A NEW SONG” 
Assuming that one regards unconstitutional subdelegation 
as a problem,71 it is beyond pointless to look to Congress for 
solutions to that problem. Congress created the problem by 
giving away its authority in the first place. Psychologists, 
historians, and political scientists are better situated than I to 
say why this has happened, but some fairly obvious considerations 
come to mind. “By delegating the ultimate decision to an agency, 
Congress can take credit for doing something while dodging the 
blame from disappointed constituents.”72 Realistically, though, can 
this kind of transparent ploy actually work to improve legislators’ 
electoral prospects? Evidently so: “[P]olitical scientists have 
documented the value of ‘credit-claiming’ and ‘position-taking’ in 
legislators’ efforts to maximize the probability of re-election.”73 
Moreover, subdelegation has efficiency benefits for legislators: 
“Legislators delegate authority in order to reduce various costs of 
legislating, which allows them to legislate more private goods. 
Stated differently, delegation reduces the legislator’s marginal 
cost of private-goods production[.]”74 It also offers efficiency of 
access for interest groups: By “unbundling” specific items (such 
as energy regulation) from everything else on the legislative 
 
 69  Id. at 23.  
 70 Of course, anyone who knows me knows that, in my personal rather than 
professional guise, I am emphatically a critic of the administrative state. They also know, 
however, that in that guise I am emphatically a critic of non-administrative states as well. 
I dispute the moral legitimacy of all governments—big, small, state, federal, 
administrative, non-administrative, constitutional, and non-constitutional. That personal 
position has, I believe, no bearing whatsoever on my empirical scholarly claims regarding 
constitutional meaning, which stand or fall on the quality of the observations and 
arguments offered for them. 
 71 Because I do not maintain that anyone must so assume, everything beyond this 
point is in the form of a hypothetical imperative. 
 72 Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial 
and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 369–70 (2010). 
 73 David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative 
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 135 (2000). 
 74 Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative 
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 56 (1982). 
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agenda (such as monetary policy, drug policy, and foreign trade) 
it allows parties with concentrated interests to focus their 
attention on institutions (agencies) wholly dedicated to their 
precise area of concern. It is not surprising that Congress and 
those who seek to influence Congress would find subdelegation 
very attractive.75 
To be sure, there are occasional token thrusts in Congress to 
gain some measure of legislative control over executive 
lawmaking. The Congressional Review Act, which is part of the 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996,76 
provides a mechanism for fast-track legislative cancellation of 
major agency rules,77 and the statute has been employed more 
than a dozen times in 2017 after being used only once in its first 
two decades.78 A version of the so-called REINS (“Regulations 
from the Executive [I]n Need of Scrutiny”) Act, which would 
require Congress legislatively to approve major rules before they 
take effect, has made it farther through Congress in 2017 than it 
has ever gone before,79 though its prospects for ultimate passage 
are dubious. Through all of this, however, the simple expedient of 
passing real statutes instead of vague mush and/or amending the 
old enactments that are really subdelegations masquerading as 
statutes is nowhere on the congressional agenda. Hence the first 
sentence of this section.80 
Nor can one plausibly rely on the courts to police legislative 
subdelegations. The Supreme Court’s complete retreat from the 
field of subdelegation is too well known to require elaborate 
summary.81 Liberal and conservative jurisprudes disagree on 
 
 75 For more background on the positive political science literature regarding 
rationales for congressional delegation, see Rodrigues, supra note 31, at 447–49. 
 76 Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 
857–74 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of Titles 5 and 15 of the United States Code). 
 77 For a brief description of the statute, see LAWSON, supra note 45, at 173–74. 
 78 See Stephen Dinan, GOP Rolled Back 14 of 15 Obama Rules Using Congressional 
Review Act, WASH.TIMES (July 22, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/ 
15/gop-rolled-back-14-of-15-obama-rules-using-congress/ [http://perma.cc/Z8G4-HX5A]. 
 79 See Eric Boehm, Rand Paul’s REINS Act Finally Makes It to Senate Floor, 
REASON.COM (July 17, 2017, 5:32 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2017/05/17/rand-pauls-
reins-act-finally-makes-it-to [http://perma.cc/BK83-85E8]. 
 80 Cf. VERMEULE, supra note 25, at 9 (“Congress episodically rouses itself to enact 
framework statutes intended to constrain executive power in a global way . . . . But these 
statutes are mostly dead letters, for the spasm of congressional resolve that leads to their 
enactment is not sustained over time.”). 
 81 See Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, supra note 46, at 328–29 (“After 
1935, the Court has steadfastly maintained that Congress need only provide an 
‘intelligible principle’ to guide decisionmaking [sic], and it has steadfastly found 
intelligible principles where less discerning readers find gibberish.”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (“[T]he conventional 
[delegation] doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”). To be 
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many things, but they have found common cause—or, more 
precisely, an overlapping consensus—in capitulation to 
congressional desire to subdelegate its authority. Some Justices 
fly the flag of surrender because, on policy grounds, they want to 
grease the wheels of the administrative state. As a near-
unanimous Supreme Court said with admirable candor (if 
perhaps less admirable lack of regard for law): “[I]n our 
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and 
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job[?!] 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general 
directives.”82 Others flee the battlefield because of an extra-
constitutional concern about judicial discretion: “[W]hile the 
doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a 
fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an 
element readily enforceable by the courts.”83 Although Justice 
Thomas has expressed some interest in enforcing a constitutional 
ban on subdelegations,84 and Justice Gorsuch may be more 
receptive to such arguments than was Justice Scalia,85 no one 
seriously expects the federal courts to rise up and smite major 
portions of the administrative state in the name of the 
Constitution of 1788. 
That leaves, as the last line of constitutional defense, the 
president.86 There is any number of tools available to presidents 
 
sure, Professor Sunstein and I may both be overstating our cases. It is surely a mistake to 
gauge the effectiveness of a principle against subdelegation by how many laws get 
overturned by courts rather than by how closely legislatures hew to that principle without 
need for judicial invalidation. See Joseph Postell & Paul D. Moreno, Not Dead Yet – or 
Never Born? The Reality of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 3 CONST. STUDIES (forthcoming 
2017). And while the subdelegation doctrine has been dead in the Supreme Court for a 
long time, it has occasional sparks of life in the lower courts (and, quite possibly, has a 
new ally on the Supreme Court). See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154 
(10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 82 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). And what, precisely, is 
Congress’s constitutional “job”? To regulate in a way and to a degree that is pleasing to 
the political sensibilities of a majority of the Supreme Court? One might think, looking at 
the Constitution, that Congress’s job is to legislate in accordance with the substantive and 
procedural norms prescribed by the Constitution. But, then again, one might think, 
looking at the Constitution, many things which are at odds with statements in Supreme 
Court opinions. The explanation, of course, is that statements in Supreme Court opinions 
almost never try to ascertain the meaning of the Constitution, so it is not at all surprising 
that they almost uniformly fail to do so. 
 83 Id. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For an explanation of why this concern about 
judicial discretion is extra-constitutional, see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The 
Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483 (2014). 
 84 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240–52 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 85 See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153–54. 
 86 Technically, the last line of constitutional defense is an armed citizenry, but 
it would surely take more than some unconstitutional subdelegations to warrant 
outright revolution. 
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to resist unconstitutional subdelegations if they are inclined to 
use those tools. Most obviously, presidents can veto proposed 
legislation that fails to make law. Congress can override those 
vetoes with a two-thirds majority in each House, but a 
presidential veto can be a serious roadblock to subdelegation. 
Moreover, the president could issue a veto message 
communicating the constitutional grounds for the action and 
thereby raise public awareness of Congress’s constitutional failure. 
The president could also recommend legislation amending or 
repealing past laws that unconstitutionally subdelegate authority. 
Appointing judges who take the Constitution seriously could also 
indirectly help in this regard. Finally, and most dramatically 
(and therefore least plausibly), the president could refuse to 
enforce laws that unconstitutionally subdelegate legislative 
power. Presidents have a power and duty of executive review 
that is equal to, and derives from the same source as, the 
collateral power of judicial review.87 If courts are allowed, and 
indeed required, to refuse to give legal effect to unconstitutional 
laws, the same is true of presidents (and everyone else in the 
constitutional order). At this point, however, the shade of Andrew 
Johnson will surely begin whispering about the possible 
consequences of presidential nonenforcement of statutes on 
constitutional grounds. A genuine constitutionalist will respond 
that the president nonetheless has an unconditional obligation to 
the Constitution, consequences be damned.88 Even if one does not 
take this extreme tack, however, there is no obvious reason why 
presidents cannot, and constitutionally should not, make use of 
the other tools at their disposal to resist subdelegation. All that 
is needed is the will to use those tools. 
At first glance, it may seem even more absurd to rely on the 
president to police subdelegations of legislative authority than to 
rely on Congress or the courts. Don’t such subdelegations by 
definition increase the power of the executive, both absolutely 
and relative to its chief institutional competitors? If Congress is 
willing to cede some, or even most, of its authority to the 
president, who would expect the president to decline the offer? 
 
 87 For a lengthy explication of this position, see generally Gary Lawson & 
Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. 
REV. 1267 (1996). 
 88 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (prescribing the presidential oath of office as: “I 
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the 
United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States”). 
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As with the Spanish Inquisition, no one expects it. But, as 
with the Spanish Inquisition, it just might appear anyway. To be 
sure, history is on the side of the skeptics. The Reagan 
Administration made a great fuss over constitutional fidelity, 
especially in the realm of separation of powers. In the 1980s, 
Attorney General Edwin Meese III gave voice to some 
monumental, and monumentally important, constitutional 
principles dealing with the separation of powers, such as 
departmentalism and the unitary executive.89 The Justice 
Department was filled with constitutional originalists who 
understood quite well that the Constitution does not authorize 
subdelegation of legislative authority. With all of that 
intellectual and political firepower assembled, what was the 
number of bills vetoed by President Reagan on the ground that 
they unconstitutionally subdelegated legislative power to the 
president? That would be zero. The number of bills introduced or 
supported by the Reagan Administration to repeal or replace old 
statutes that unconstitutionally subdelegate legislative power to 
the president? That would also be zero. The number of such bills 
vetoed or championed, respectively, by either of the Bush 
Administrations? Yep, zero again. (I assume that no one finds it 
necessary for me to repeat these numbers for modern Democrat 
administrations.) All conventional grounds for judgment suggest 
that the executive department is a central part of the problem of 
subdelegation of legislative authority and likely the last place 
that one should look for a solution. 
Enter Donald Trump. Exit conventional grounds for 
judgment. Whatever one thinks of Donald Trump (and I confess 
that I have a higher regard for him than do most of the people 
with whom I usually associate), one must acknowledge that the 
usual rules of politics do not apply to him. Indeed, his election 
was, at least for many who voted for him, precisely a pair of 
double-barreled middle fingers thrust into the face of political 
convention (with a loud razzberry added for good measure). The 
fact that invoking a constitutional principle against 
subdelegation of legislative authority would elicit shrieks of 
horror from the political and cultural establishment would not 
necessarily deter President Trump from doing it. Indeed, it just 
might be an added incentive. 
The question is whether there is anything substantive that 
would or could motivate President Trump to take a stand against 
 
 89 See Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary 
Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 701 (2005). 
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legislative subdelegation, perhaps by vetoing proposed legislation 
on constitutional subdelegation grounds and issuing a stinging 
veto message. Several considerations suggest—and I emphasize 
that I deliberately use the word “suggest” in its literal and 
modest sense—that there might be. 
First, President Trump’s key appointments to legal offices 
speak to a commitment to constitutional first principles that 
exceeds that of any president in my lifetime. His first 
appointment to the Supreme Court was Neil Gorsuch, who, as a 
court of appeals judge, specifically raised the idea of reviving the 
subdelegation doctrine.90 President Trump’s nominations to the 
lower federal courts thus far also have originalists cheering and 
maybe even salivating. And both of his appointees to top 
executive department legal positions—Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions and White House Counsel Don McGahn—are long-time 
advocates (if not necessarily consistent practitioners) of 
originalism. The pairing is significant. My recollection from 
three-plus decades ago is that the Reagan Justice Department 
was more than occasionally at odds with the White House 
Counsel’s Office, which had considerably less enthusiasm than 
did Attorney General Meese and his staff for picking fights about 
broad structural principles. That kind of internal conflict reduces 
the likelihood of bold action. If the Department of Justice and 
White House Counsel’s Office are both strongly committed to 
originalism, they can speak with a united front on subdelegation. 
No originalist can defend, with a straight face, the gross 
subdelegations of legislative power that pervade modern 
government as consistent with the Constitution.91  
Second, all of the foregoing considerations suggest that 
President Trump is inclined to defer, on legal and constitutional 
matters, to those who he regards as reliable experts on those 
subjects. No one seriously believes that Donald Trump entered 
the political arena in 2015 with a well-formed theory of 
constitutional interpretation in mind. Obviously, he has decided 
that originalists are the go-to folks in this area. If, hypothetically, 
President Trump’s Attorney General and White House Counsel 
both recommend a veto on constitutional grounds, it is not 
 
 90 See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153−54. 
 91 At the risk of repetition: They can certainly defend those subdelegations as 
consistent with all manner of things besides the Constitution, and those other things 
might well be more important to any given person than is the meaning of the 
Constitution. I am not saying unconditionally that originalists must urge the president to 
oppose subdelegations. I am only saying that they have good reason to do so if they regard 
the meaning of the Constitution as normatively relevant, and that they must do so if they 
regard the meaning of the Constitution as normatively decisive. 
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absurd to imagine that President Trump would take that 
recommendation very seriously. 
Third, former White House strategist Steve Bannon declared 
in February 2017 that the Trump Administration was committed 
to “deconstruction of the administrative state.”92 The exact 
meaning of the phrase is not important here. The significance for 
present purposes is that the standard response to any attempt to 
revive a constitutional principle against subdelegation is to 
complain that it would be an assault on the administrative 
state.93 That certainly seemed to be an important driver of the 
decision in Mistretta,94 and I have heard something like it from 
my colleagues for decades. If Mr. Bannon truly speaks for the 
Administration on this point, it suggests that the standard 
establishment response will not resonate all that well with the 
current president. To be sure, there are nontrivial arguments to 
be made that the unbundling afforded by subdelegation increases 
democratic responsiveness in some respects,95 but these do not 
seem like arguments that will carry much weight with a 
constitutionalist who wants to deconstruct the administrative state. 
Fourth, every force in the legal universe is currently aligned 
to jump at the chance to constrain executive power. The political, 
legal, and cultural establishments all despise the current 
occupant of the White House. If there is ever going to be a time 
for limits on executive power, this is it. And if those limits come 
from the White House itself, would the establishment really find 
it within themselves to resist? 
Perhaps there never will be a time for such limits. Certainly, 
those who think of President Trump as a swaggering, 
overbearing, tin-plated dictator with delusions of godhood (or 
perhaps even as a Denebian slime devil)96 will regard as 
laughable the idea that he would turn down power. I am more 
inclined than many to think that Donald Trump cannot be 
written off as a power-mad autocrat, but maybe the many are 
 
 92 See Tim Hains, Stephen Bannon: Core of Trump’s Platform Is “Deconstruction of 
the Administrative State,” REAL CLEAR POLITICS (July 17, 2017), https://www.realclear 
politics.com/video/2017/02/23/stephen_bannon_pillar_of_trumps_platform_is_deconstructi
on_of_the_administrative_state.html [http://perma.cc/F7RS-MWES]. 
 93 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 
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right. Maybe Adrian Vermeuele is right about the inevitability of 
the administrative state; it certainly would not surprise me if he 
was right about that. Perhaps, as with every other modern 
president before him, Donald Trump will choose expanded 
executive power over the Constitution, and perhaps the 
establishment’s love for the administrative state is stronger than 
its hatred for President Trump. But maybe, just maybe, an odd 
combination of originalism, swamp draining, and the looming 
specter of Trump-as-Congress will lead to something that no one 
expects—maybe even something constitutionally more significant 
than a comfy chair. 
 
 
